A minimum-exposure, minimum-elevation military aircraft heuristic route selection model  by Dorsett, M.J. & Wyskida, R.M.
A minimum-exposure, 
minimum-elevation military 
aircraft heuris tic route 
selection model 
M. J. Dorsett 
US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35898. USA 
R. M. Wyskida 
Industrial and Systems Engineering Department, The University of Alabama in 
Huntsville, Huntsville, Alabama 35899, USA 
(Received November 1983) 
An heuristic route selection model is presented for developing military 
aircraft routes through hostile terrain. The capability of modern air 
defence systems has forced military aircraft to utilize low level flight to 
avoid detection and increase survivability. By identifying the high and 
low elevation points within an area, the model determines their exposure 
values, which are used with their height and internode distance to 
calculate a penalty for flying to a point from the current position. In 
developing a route, the model utilizes basic information concerning 
air defence deployment, initial and destination points, and terrain data, 
to specify a minimum-exposure, minimum-elevation route. The results 
include the development of eight routes for 10 by 10 km areas, and six 
larger terrain areas varying in size from 20 by 20 km to 35 by 35 km. 
Validation shows the heuristic to be extremely competitive with visual 
procedures, and to require considerably less time. 
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The determination of the best route between two points 
is a subset of the classic ‘travelling salesman’ problem. In 
many network problems, the search is for the shortest 
route between two nodes. Electronic applications define 
it as the minimum connection length between components 
or circuits. 
The routing of vehicles between an origin and destina- 
tion is an everyday occurrence. One can immediately 
imagine trucks travelling along a highway, but it also applies 
to aircraft, ship, or rail traffic routing. The increase in fuel 
cost for transportation has caused a greater awareness of 
optimal vehicle routing. For the military, the best routing 
between two points can have an entirely different meaning. 
An area of considerable interest to the Department of 
Defense is both air defence of vital assets and the penetra- 
tion of these defences. High performance aircraft have 
significantly changed the complexity of modern day war- 
fare which has resulted in missile systems becoming the 
backbone of air defence. In addition, helicopters have 
developed to the extent that they have the capability of a 
fighter aircraft at low altitude with air speeds approaching 
200 mph. When analysing the interaction of aircraft and 
air defence systems, the offensive problem is to find the 
best aircraft routing to attack these defended assets. The 
defensive problem is how best to protect these assets from 
the attacking aircraft. 
The attacking aircraft have the advantage of selecting 
those tactics which enhance their survival and maximize 
their effectiveness. The capability of medium and high 
altitude air defence systems impose a high degree of risk to 
aircraft survivability, when an aircraft is operating in the 
air space protected by these systems. This situation leaves 
high-speed, low-level flight as a preferred tactic for the 
aircraft to avoid these air defences. Terrain following flight 
requires an aircraft to lower its maximum air speed. (Air- 
craft is used here in a broad sense to include fixed wing and 
rotary wing systems.) Thus, a best route is one which 
increases the routed aircraft’s chances of survival by mini- 
mizing its exposure to enemy air defences. 
A terrain following route can be optimized in the 
vertical plane, but difficulty exists with the ground track in 
the horizontal plane. Kovit’ stated that if one knew the 
0307-904X/85/02131-08/$03.00 
0 1985 Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. Appl. Math. Modelling, 1985, Vol. 9, April 131 
Military aircraft heuristic route selection model: M. J. Dorsett and R. M. Wyskida 
route which minimized the exposure, then there would be 
an easing of the vertical constraint imposed by the air 
defences. Funk2 provided a method for determining the 
optimal vertical flight path for a given route. Shannon 
er aZ.3 utilized a dynamic programming approach for identi- 
fying optimal attack routes while Clark et aZ.4 reported 
on a helicopter route selection model in which the inter- 
visibility and terrain analyses are performed exterior to 
the actual model. 
Terrain modelling is a major consideration in any mili- 
tary aircraft route model. Cochran and Kelly,’ Malyavshiy,’ 
Weldon,’ and Weldon’have developed adequate terrain 
models. However, these models do not provide for aircraft 
route selection analysis. 
This paper discusses an heuristic method for selecting a 
minimum-exposure, minimum-elevation route for terrain 
following aircraft flight through defended terrain originally 
developed by Dorsett.g 
Tactical scenario 
There are two basic situations of air defence war gaming 
that a tactician can analyse. In one case, the tactical situa- 
tion is portrayed from the defender or air defence site 
aspect, for the other, the tactical situation is presented 
from the attacker’s or pilot’s viewpoint. The specific prob- 
lem addressed is that of selecting a route which a low flying 
aircraft can use to penetrate the air defence coverage, while 
at the same time minimizing its exposure to these defences. 
Low flying tactical fighters ordinarily fly within 200m of 
the terrain, whereas helicopters have been known to fly at 
almost ground level in Vietnam. 
The defender wishes to allocate his air defences in a pat- 
tern to achieve maximum coverage. The sensors (radar, 
infrared, or visual) are positioned in the terrain to be 
defended, such that visibility is maximized in the principal 
direction of site responsibility. In actual terrain there can 
be certain azimuths for which coverage is marginal or 
non-existent. Air defence sites are ordinarily situated so 
that individual site visibilities overlap each other, thereby 
providing a pattern with total coverage. Thus, any portion 
of the total area is being covered by one or more air 
defence sites. The attacker is faced with the situation of 
attempting to select a route which avoids these sites and 
maximizes his probability of reaching the target, and 
accomplishing the mission. 
Along with terrain following, there are some other 
options the tactician can choose to enhance the surviva- 
bility of the aircraft and pilot. The attacker can use 
electronic countermeasures (ECM), also known as jamming; 
an anti-radiation missile (ARM) could be fired at each 
radiating radar; and decoys or remotely piloted vehicles 
(RPVs) could be utilized to saturate the skies so that an 
aircraft could be hidden among the RPVs. To reach the 
primary target, a pre-emptive raid could be made against 
the air defences. Naturally, the defender is fully aware of 
these and other methods that the attacker can employ. 
Models * 
Within the defence community, computer simulation is 
normally employed to evaluate the tactical situation out- 
lined above. Two major models currently in use by the US 
Army air defence community and the US Air Force for 
studies and analysis are TACOS and COMO III. Smaller 
simulations exist such as ADGEM, ADAGE, SORTIE, and 
*Models cited here can be obtained from the Defense Technical 
Information Center, USA 
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MABS. Several other tactical air defence models have been 
used over the years, but have become inactive because of 
their limited dissemination within the air defence com- 
munity (MADS and ENGAGE). 
Numerous one-time models have been created for the 
analysis of particular operations or scenarios. Among these 
models are ADOPT, the DYNTAX-Helicopter model (DYN- 
FLITE), and Optimal Attack Route model, which have 
been developed to identify the aircraft flight along the 
safest route (minimum-exposure) to its target. The methods 
in which these models solve the routing problem are either 
to utilize a backward dynamic programming approach or 
limit the area which the route algorithm can utilize. Using 
a corridor to limit the area of consideration requires that an 
analysis be made of the topography in which the simulation 
battle will take place, thereby constraining the generality of 
the route algorithm. 
Sensor coverage 
With low altitude targets, radar sensors have clutter 
problems when receiving the return signal. There can be a 
high level of noise because of ground objects and terrain 
features which tend to obscure the reflected signal of any 
targets that may be nearby. Any aircraft operating in an 
area with opposing air defences will attempt to fly as low 
as possible so as to be in the clutter of the radar return 
signal. However, the faster the aircraft speed, the higher 
it must fly to be responsive to the pilot’s terrain avoidance 
commands. Thus, the aircraft pilot has two conflicting 
constraints: the aircraft must fly no higher than Xm to 
avoid detection, yet it must fly at least Ym above the 
terrain to maintain clearance. A major problem exists for 
the pilot when Y is greater than X. 
The degree of coverage a radar site possesses from a 
given location is dependent on the target altitude and the 
local terrain. An aircraft at 50 m altitude is more likely to 
be detected than an aircraft at 20 m altitude. Figure 1 
graphically illustrates sensor visibility. 
pEJ Vwble 0 Not vlslble X Site locatlon 
Figure 7 Air defence site, 10 km radius, target altitude 20 m, 
visibility 29.85% 
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Terrain data 
The data base used in this research is Defense Mapping 
Agency (DMA) terrain data which provides the height 
above sea level for each terrain location. A granularity of 
70 m was selected in utilizing the data base. The problem 
with the selected grid density is the quantity of data points 
for even a moderate size area. A 20 by 20 km area results 
in 90 000 entries. 
In utilizing the terrain data, some assumptions are 
necessary to relate the data to the route selection problem. 
The premise that the aircraft route will follow the valleys 
and low areas requires that the low elevation terrain points 
be identified within the terrain data. Therefore, a grouping 
or clustering process can be used to identify these low 
elevation areas. Also, the partitioning of the area into 1 km 
squares allows for identification of local minimum altitudes 
rather than a single global value. Similarly, high elevation 
areas are found. 
A terrain data array is shown in Table I. As can be seen 
in this table, the variation in the point to point values can 
be stratified. Once the data is grouped into elevation inter- 
vals (or bands), the terrain relief is shown as plateaux with 
the lowest plateau being the lowest elevation area. The 
lowest stratum is a cluster of lowest terrain points from 
which the cluster centroid can then be utilized as a node 
point in the routing network. The high points within the 
data are similarly identified which results in all the low and 
high plateaux being represented by a set of centroids. 
must have its LOS to each sensor determined. The result of 
this determination is an exposure value associated with each 
node point. 
To calculate the exposure value of a node point, the 
range between the node-sensor combination, together with 
the number of sensors, is required. The further a sensor is 
located from the node, the less of a threat to the aircraft, 
since the probability of kill (Pk) is partially a function of 
range. However, the number of air defence sites having 
visibility to a given point will increase the overall Pk. Since 
the sensors tend to be deployed behind and along the 
general flow of the main battle-line, an average range to 
sensors was selected for use in calculating an exposure 
value. Exposure values in a localized area will tend to be 
roughly the same because sensors that can see a single point 
generally can see several points in that local area. Inasmuch 
as the exposure value will not be utilized independently, 
it is not necessary to differentiate precisely among the 
high or low nodes. The exposure value is given by: 
where 
EPj exposure value for node j with all sensors that have 
LOS with this node 
NS number of sensors that have LOS with node j 
R max maximum node-sensor separation that exists for all 
node-sensor combinations 
Rsi distance between the sensor and node j 
The value EPj is calculated for all node-sensor combina- 
tions for both high and low elevation centroids. As the 
Model development 
A major consideration in selecting an aircraft route is to 
ensure that the route avoids enemy air defences as much as 
possible. A penalty function will be developed which 
utilizes line of sight (LOS), height, and distance to deter- 
mine the degree of visibility along a route. Each centroid 
Tab/e 7 Elevation array (m) 
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route is being developed, the exposure values for the nodes 
are used in developing a penalty function. 
Once a route’s node points and visibility have been 
determined, the method for linking these nodes must con- 
sider two other characteristics of the node: the node’s 
elevation with respect to surrounding nodes. and the dis- 
tance to these nodes. With these two factors additional 
separation in ranking the nodes can be achieved. 
Several military fighter and helicopter pilots were con- 
tacted to discuss terrain following or ‘nap of the earth’ 
flying. The helicopter pilots unanimously reported using a 
range of 1 km to consider their next position. Even though 
major terrain features used for reference points can be seen 
several kilometres away, terrain following flights require a 
pilot to concentrate on the immediate area to avoid terrain 
impact. Fighter pilots reported similar considerations when 
flying at low level and that continuous training is required 
to maintain proficiency. Therefore, 1 km was selected as 
the rectilinear distance about a node to define a neighbour- 
hood. This neighbourhood is 2 km square and should 
contain at least one node within 1 km of the referenced 
node. If no node exist, then the rectilinear distance is 
doubled. 
A value can now be assigned to these neighbourhood 
nodes based on their elevation and distance from the 
current node position which is centrally located. The 
higher elevation nodes would normally be avoided in favour 
of travelling to a low elevation node. A penalty for height 
is added to the exposure value of each node by the following 
factor: 
where 
ZPj penalty assigned to node j 
zi elevation of node j 
Zmin minimum elevation of the neighbourhood nodes 
ZR range between maximum and minimum elevation 
in the neighbourhood 
O< ZPj< 1 
To account for distance from the current node position, 
the penalty is associated with travelling short distances 
rather than long distances. The idea is to travel as far as 
possible in the neighbourhood to reach a low, least exposed 
node. Thus, the distance factor is given by: 
Dj - Dmin 
DR 
where 
DPi penalty for a short distance between the central and 
neighbourhood node 
oi distance to neighbourhood node J’ 
Dmin minimum distance 
DR range between maximum and minimum distance in 
the neighbourhood 
O<DPi < 1 
Adding these two factors to the exposure value and seeking 
a minimum, results in the following function: 
min EPi = MS 
NS 
Ix Rsi 
S=l 
-~ 
max 
NS 
L Rmax 
The route objective is to provide a path to the terminal 
position. Therefore, preference should be given to those 
nodes which lie in the desired direction of travel. To imple- 
ment this concept, the vector heading from the current 
position to the terminal node is found. The nodes which 
lie within 90” of either side of this heading have a weight 
of 1. Those nodes greater than 90” are located behind the 
current position and have a weight of 2. The exposure 
penalty of a neighbourhood node is multiplied by this 
weight to give preference to those nodes which are ahead 
of the current position as shown in Figure 2. If a position 
behind the current one has a very low exposure penalty 
it can still be selected, but the route procedure will re- 
orient to the terminal node and will favour the destination 
direction. 
When the route model has reached a position within 
1 km of the terminal node, the weighting scheme is modi- 
fied to be more selective. The heading angle is reduced to 
4.5” of the route direction and preference is given to those 
nodes within 1 km, The terminal weighting schemes for the 
selection process are given in Figure 3. To prevent the 
model from overshooting the terminal node, large penalties 
are assigned to the area beyond 1 km. 
Air defence radars usually have an acquisition range 
greater than the engagement range of the weapon system 
(guns or missiles). An engagement boundary around the 
air defence site is assumed to be the weapon’s kill radius. 
A vector from the current position to the sensor is calcu- 
lated to give the azimuth and range to the sensor. A cone 
is used to form a high rejection area for nodes. The current 
position is the apex of the cone and the base is twice the 
kill radius, with the sensor at the base midpoint. A neigh- 
bourhood node lying in this cone and ahead of the kill 
zone has a weight of 2. If it lies beyond this boundary, the 
weight is 10 giving a node point which would cause the 
route to overfly or pass too close to the air defence site to 
be avoided. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the current 
node (Nk) and the sensors, the terminal node and the new 
node (Nj). The angles shown in the figure are utilized in 
calculating the weighting values. Integer arithmetic allows 
a uniform weight to be assigned within any one area. The 
angle of the new node Nj from the destination heading is 
given by one of the following equations: 
DIrectIon of 
figure 2 Weighting of heading 
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Figure 3 Weighting of terminal node 
Figure 3 values 
termlnol webghtlng 
Radar Avoidance Weight is given by one of the following 
equations: 
AWi=O AS-ANi>AK 
AWi=2 RNj<RS-RK AS-ANiGAK 
AWi = 10 RNi>RS-RK AS-ANi<AK 
where the variables in the equations and Figure 4 are: 
ANi 
AH 
ANT 
AS 
AK 
RS 
RK 
RNi 
RWi 
angle from x-axis to new node j 
angle from x-axis to terminal node 
angle between new node and terminal node 
angle to sensor from x-axis 
angle to each side of sensor heading which would 
be within the kill radius 
range to sensor from current route node 
kill radius of weapon system 
distance to new node j 
weight of node j based on its range to the terminal 
node 
For a given node k, and its neighbourhood nodes 
(i, . ,j), the next destination node is Nk+r . The new 
node, k + 1, is the minimum exposure penalty node, j, 
which is defined by: 
N ,+,=min(Wj+RWi+AWi).EPi 
i 
where 
N k+l next node selected for route, given current node k 
wi weight of node j based on its angle heading 
R Wj weight of node j based on its range to terminal node 
AWi weight of node j based on whether or not it lies in 
the radar avoidance cone 
/iermlnal! 
Since the routing is a serial set of node selections, the 
model for the route can be written as a multistage function 
where each neighbourhood is a stage (or state) of the route 
selection. The model F(N) is given by: 
-- 
- 
x 
Figure 4 Radar avoidance weighting 
(1) ANT?ANi-AH -180”GANTG 180” 
(2) ANT = 360” + AH - ANi ANT > 180” 
(3) ANT = ANi -AH + 360” ANT < -180” 
Direction Weight is: 
Wi = IANTI /90” + 1 
Terminal Weight is given by one of the two equations 
below: 
R Wi = 2 lANTl/45” + 1 G 1 km range to target 
R Wi = (2 [ANTI /45” +l) 100 > 1 km range to target 
n-1 
F(N) = z Nk+l(wk*+~EP;+l) 
k=l 
where 
N minimum value for the k + 1 node selected 
Wl,, weighting for the k + 1 node 
EPz+I exposure value for the k + 1 node 
k node at point k along the route 
It is necessary for the route selection logic to evaluate 
whether or not route nodes are adjacent to each other. 
In an attempt to avoid air defence sites, the route may 
reverse directions. The route selected consists of a node 
set which must be evaluated to determine if it contains a 
subset that will provide a more direct route. By evaluating 
each node i ahead of the current position k, the closest 
one is found resulting in a smooth route. Node k is linked 
to node i through the following expression: 
Lki = yjn [(xi -xk)’ + (yi --yk)2]1’2 
where 
Lki link between k and i 
(xk, yk) current node position 
(Xi,yi) next node position 
k=i+l,...,n 
Appl. Math. Modelling, 1985, Vol. 9, April 135 
Military aircraft heuristic route selection model: M. J. Dorsett and R. M. Wyskida 
Once i has been found, then k is redefined to this value of 
i and the process is repeated until the total route has been 
evaluated, 
This refinement to the model route logic permits identi- 
fication of a shorter more direct route to the destination. 
The total path length for the refined route is given by: 
D1, = c min(LkJ 
ki 
150 @ Radar sensor 103 
-90 -85 14 
140 Y-----x I’ ’ \ \ ’ 130 \93 , 
120 @’ 
83 
82; 
I 
where D1, is the total length from 1 to n summed over the 
refined route points only. 
1 
80 
70 
B2 
Q3 
73; 
I 
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Model validation 
For the model to be of any use, it must be tested and 
validated. A comparison is required between a tactician’s 
route analysis and the heuristic model which attempts to 
approximate that analysis. 
Figure 5 depicts the terrain area used in the test case and 
60 
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30 
t 
-48,-d’% 
49p_---0~4~ 
$‘39 I 
I 
J-29 
27P- _ o=- 
/’ 26 
15.d’ 
indicates the relative position of the hills and valleys with 
the sensors. There is a valley that proceeds from the south- 
west to the north-east through the centre of this terrain. 
The rough terrain is located to the south-east with a large 
flat-top hill located.in the north-west. 
20- 
11 /’ 4 9 ly 
104 ,p--C-- 
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Figure 6 Complete information route. Scale: 1 unit = 70 m 
The routes shown in Figure 5 were developed by 
analysts whose expertise is in air defence modelling. Pro- 
viding them with the location of the sensors and the route 
end points on a topographic map, the routes A, B, and C 
were developed. If a direct route is required, route A is 
proposed since it follows the valley floor and passes mid- 
way between two of the sensors. If the sensors are to be 
avoided, routes B and C are chosen since they use the hills 
as masks and bypass the sensors. Routes B and C were 
preferred by all the analysts. The question of model validity 
is whether or not similar routes are produced by the model 
decision logic. The major piece of information the model 
considers that the tactician has difficulty in assimilating is 
the LOS determination. The degree of visibility a node has 
with the sensors provides a basis upon which a quantitative 
selection can be made. 
The results of the model are a series of linked points 
which comprise a route. A comparison of Figure 6 with 
Figure 5 indicates that the preferred route C is approxi- 
mated by the model logic. The degree of match between 
the model route and the manual route gives a visual indica- 
tion of acceptability. However, a numerical route exposure 
value is more meaningful. Consequently, the exposure value 
for each route was calculated for a comparison basis. The 
calculation of route exposure is given as: 
n-1 
EVR = c EV(N,+,) ‘f 
i=l [ 1 
where 0 
D total length of the route, zy:i di+i 
EV(Ni+,) exposure value of route node if 1 
di+r distance from node i to node i + 1 
EVR exposure value of the route 
Using this relationship, Table 2 presents the route exposure 
values for the three manual routes and the model route. 
The preferred route C and the model route achieved an 
exposure value of 0.844 and 0.888, respectively. A plot of 
the route has proven to be the best means of route evalua- 
tion. The tables provide the quantitative results; however, 
the route graphics provide a visual comparison between 
routes. 
Small area analysis 
@ Radar sensor 
A 0 C Routes 
Figure 5 Terrain area one (10 km square) 
The performance of the model was judged by varying 
sensor and route end points to provide different routes. 
Tables 3 and 4 provide the X, Y, Z coordinate location 
of sensors and route X, Y, Z coordinate end points used in 
the two small terrain areas. The eight cases using these 
sets of sensors and end points are summarized in Table 5. 
Area 1 contained 106 low node points and 94 high node 
points while Area 2 possessed 106 low node points and 
103 high node points. All node points had an exposure 
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Table 2 Route exposure values 
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Route EVR 
A 1.582 
6 1.325 
C 0.844 
Model 0.888 
Table 3 Sensor X, Y, Z coordinate locations 
The terrain in Area 1 is flat to moderately hilly, whereas 
the terrain in Area 2 is rougher (cases S-8). There is a 
prominent ridge running from the south-east to the centre 
of Area 2. There are valleys on each side of this ridgeline 
that join in the north-west. In Figures 7 and 8, the route 
identification is difficult when the sensors are located in 
the northern and central areas since the radars are deployed 
on the high ground to cover the approach corridors. When 
the sensors are located on top of the ridge and to the south, 
the routes identified follow the base of this ridge and 
outflank the radar sensor (Figure 8). 
Area 1 
Set 1 
Sensor (X, Y, 2) 
1 (68, 70,300) 
2 (36, 119, 350) 
3 (47.99, 310) 
Area 2 
1 (28, 114, 330) 1 (78, 47, 350) 
2 (61,90, 380) 2 (85, 42, 340 
3 (78, 71,360) 3 (100, 17, 320) 
Set 2 
Sensor (X, Y, Z) 
1 (115,116,330) 
2 (90.84.340) 
3 (103.45.320) 
Table 4 Initial and final route X, Y, Z coordinate points 
Area 1 
Route Node From (X, Y, Z) Node To (X, Y, Z) 
1 1 (7,3, 270) 86 (87, 124, 310) 
2 31 (11, 45, 280) 96 (135,135, 360) 
Area 2 
1 3 (26.4. 350) 81 (118.111.310) 
2 35 ~11,50,300~ 84 (128,114,320) 
Table 5 Small area cases 
Route Sensor LOW High Route 
Area set set Case nodes nodes nodes Penalty 
1 1 1 1 106 94 25 3925 
1 2 1 2 106 94 24 4475 
1 1 2 3 106 94 18 3858 
1 2 2 4 106 94 20 5863 
2 1 1 5 106 103 13 850 
2 2 1 6 106 103 17 1309 
2 1 2 7 106 103 16 863 
2 2 2 8 106 103 15 615 
value calculated which was the first factor in determining 
the penalty value for travelling through that node. 
Figure 6 shows the position of the sensors and the 
resulting route for the first case. The route avoids the air 
defence sensors by travelling east before turning north. The 
destination point is approached by circling around the area 
to point -90 before the final leg of the route is completed. 
Large area analysis 
Several size terrain areas were used to evaluate the 
model’s performance. The initial point was held constant 
and the destination and number of sensors were varied. 
Table 6 gives the X, Y, Z coordinate location of the sensors 
and the corresponding area size. The areas ranged from 
20 by 20 km to 35 by 35 km. The elevation varied from 
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Table 6 Sensor X, Y, Z coordinates of deployment 
20 X 20 km area 35 X 35 km area 
Sensor ix, Y, Z) Sensor (X, Y, Z) 
1 (97, 280, 500) 1 ~300,414,490) 
2 (165, 250,440) 2 (371,214,490) 
3 (193, 71,400) 3 (14, 314, 450) 
4 (285,328,450) 
5 (228, 407. 520) 
25 X 25 km area 6 (285, 243, 450) 
7 (200, 214,410) 
1 (97, 280, 500) 8 (336, 71, 350) 
2 (165, 250,440) 9 (364,288, 530) 
3 (193, 71,400) 10 (97, 280, 500) 
30 X 30 km area 
Sensor (x, Y,Z) 
1 (97, 280, 500) 
2 (336, 71, 350) 
3 (364, 288, 530) 
Table 7 Large area cases 
Low High Route Run time 
Area Sensors nodes nodes nodes Penalty (s) 
20x20 3 415 389 28 3510 79.5 
25 X25 3 648 624 35 5086 114.1 
30 x30 3 938 918 63 7793 155.1 
35x35 3 1289 1258 66 5325 187.6 
35x35 5 1289 1258 86 7097 216.9 
35x35 10 1289 1258 97 19 942 284.3 
270 to 850 m for the 35 by 35 km cases. The limiting 
factor concerning area size is computer core capacity while 
utilizing the fine granularity of 70 m. 
The south-west corner of each area is the same. The 
larger size areas are obtained by increasing the x and y 
distance from this location. The test area discussed above 
is the south-west 10 by 10 km sector of these larger areas. 
As one travels from the south-west to the north-east, the 
terrain becomes progressively rougher, thus, routes were 
identified to travel this same direction. Since the areas 
are larger, the lethal radii of the systems were increased 
to 6 km. These large areas resulted in voluminous model 
outputs, which are summarized in Table 7. The routes 
developed by the model for the large areas possessed the 
same characteristics as the small areas. The computer 
processing time for each of the cases indicates that terrain 
size significantly increases the run times for the model. 
Conclusions 
This research has addressed an area of air defence 
modelling which is normally analysed visually with topo- 
graphic maps and coverage diagrams before any tactical 
gaming is performed. A significant problem in analysing 
terrain from a topographic map is perceiving the three- 
dimensional aspects of terrain features. The degree of 
visibility a manually developed route will have can only 
be estimated. Any route selected is based on the tactical 
ability of an individual. Using the subjective route for air 
defence modelling adds an unknown to the war gaming 
results. 
The developed model overcomes the shortcomings 
cited above and provides a minimum-exposure, minimum- 
elevation route. The developed route then serves as a 
baseline from which other flight paths can be evaluated. 
The model provides the visibility or exposure of all the 
high and low elevation nodes within the area. These values 
can be used as a reference for evaluating the visibility of 
specific areas of the terrain in addition to route identi- 
fication. 
Terrain roughness has a marked effect on the developed 
route. By placing the radar sensors at key positions to 
cover approach corridors, the model develops long routes 
in searching for a minimum exposure route. The long 
routes indicate the problem of traversing an area un- 
detected by modern air defences. The addition of more 
sensors increases the penalty associated with travel through 
an area and also increases the route length. In the 35 by 
3.5 km case, the penalty value increased from 5325 for the 
three radar case to 19 942 for the 10 radar case. The route 
nodes also varied from 66 to 97 in the initial routes. 
The decision logic that is used in this model is by no 
means the only one that could be utilized. There needs to 
be the ability to enter check points through which the 
route must pass on its way to the destination. Along this 
same line of reasoning, the model could be modified to 
evaluate a proposed route rather than find the route. 
The idea of limiting the next node selection to a neigh- 
bourhood about the current position could be expanded 
to other problems besides air defence aircraft routes. The 
routing of oil and gas pipelines could be analysed using the 
model. The radar sites could be a town or built-up area to 
be avoided. The weighting of the height penalty could be 
increased to favour level terrain. Hence, several other areas 
of application are possible. 
References 
Kovit, B. Space/Aero., 1965,43 (5), 78 
Funk, J. E. PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976 
Shannon, R. E. et al. ‘Optimal attack route method’, Report 
No. 76, Vol II, The University of Alabama in Huntsville, 1970 
Clark, G. M. ef al. ‘The helicopter route selection model’, 
Report No. RF-297%FR-76-4, Ohio State University, 1976 
Cochran, T. and Kelly, R. ‘Project AMSIM: terrain models’, 
R&port 261, Litton Scientific Support Laboratory, Fort Ord, 
California, 197 1 
Malyavskiy, B. K. Geodesy, Mapping and Phoiogrammetry, 
1973,15 (4), 193 
Weldon, M. R. ‘A general automated terrain simulation’, Reporr 
No. TR- WS-74-1, US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama, 1974 
Weldon, M. R. ‘A model of masking by terrain applied to visual 
observation’, Report No. TR- WS- 75-1, US Army Missile 
Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 1975 
Dorsett, M. J. PhD Dissertation, The University of Alabama in 
Huntsville, 1980 
138 Appl. Math. Modelling, 1985, Vol. 9, April 
